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a b s t r a c t
This paper introduces a formal and modular technique allowing to
automatically enforce a security policy on a given concurrent sys-
tem. Given a concurrent program P and a security policy φ, we
automatically generate another program P ′ that satisfies φ and be-
haves like P , except that it stops when P tries to violate the security
policy φ. We use extended version of process algebra ACP (Alge-
bra of Communicating Process) and BPA (Basic Process Algebra) as
formal languages to specify both concurrent system and security
policy.
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
One of the important goals of the software development process is to prove that the produced
systems always meet their requirements. However, making this kind of proofs requires high qualified
persons and they are almost very subtle and complex. Since it is also a very expensive operation,
it is generally omitted and we try to test the system as best as we can to reduce the risk of errors.
For some critical system however, we have no choice and we pay the price to avoid the catastrophic
consequences of errors. Therefore, tools like theorem prover and those used for automatic generation
of software are helpful to significantly reduce the cost of proof.We hope that this tool will be powerful
and simple enough so that even small companies and individuals with little budget and theoretical
skills can benefit from it to produce high quality software.
This paper proposes an algebraic and automatic approach that could generate from a given
program, and a security policy, a new version of this program that respects the requested security
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Fig. 1. Conservative enforcement vs. liberal enforcement.
policy. More precisely, we define an operator⊗ that takes as input a process P and a security policy
Φ and generates P ′ = P ⊗ Φ , a new process that respects the following conditions:
• P ′|∼ Φ , i.e., P ′ ‘‘satisfies’’ the security policyΦ .
• P ′ ⊑ P , i.e., behaviors of P ⊗ Φ are also behaviors of P .
• ∀ Q : ((Q |∼ φ) ∧ (Q ⊑ P))⇒ Q ⊑ P ′, i.e., all good behaviors of P are also behaviors P ⊗ Φ .
Amongst the desired properties, the traces of P ′ should be those accepted by both of P and Φ (i.e.
P ∩Φ). Resolving this kind of problem is however not possible for any kind of security policies. In fact,
at run time and some time even statically, we cannot guarantee that something good will happen
(liveness properties) which may lead to an execution trace that does not respect the security policy if
the process has not be stopped from the beginning. To dealwith this problem,we canpropose different
kind of attitudes:
• Conservative enforcement: The program should be terminated as soon as its violates the security
policy even if the current run could be completed by another suffix so that the security propertywill
be respected. With this attitude, only safety properties could be enforced and liveness properties
will block the program from the early beginning.
• Liberal enforcement: Do not abort the execution of the process if it could be completed by a suffix
so that the security policy will be satisfied.With this attitude, we enforcemore properties than the
conservative one, but the program may terminate without satisfying the security policy.
To sum up, as shown by Fig. 1, the conservative enforcement will generate fault negative while the
liberal enforcement will generate fault positive and no one of them reach the desired result.
In the rest of this paperwe develop the liberal enforcement, but the idea can be extended to handle
the conservative approach. For the specification of concurrent systems, we use an extended version of
ACP ‘‘Algebra for Communicating Process’’ (Baeten, 2005) denoted by ACPφ . The language used for the
specification of security policies, in the other side, is the ‘‘Basic Process Algebra’’ denoted by BPA∗δ,1.
The language ACPφ is principally ACP enhanced with and enforcement operator so that no extra effort
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Table 1
Syntax of BPA∗δ,1 .
P1, P2 ::= δ | 1 | a | P1.P2 | P1 + P2 | P1∗P2
is needed to produce a process that respects a given security policy. We prove also that ACPφ and ACP
are two equivalent languages by defining some functions allowing to automatically translate process
written in ACPφ to their equivalent forms in ACP . These results provide an elegant technique allowing
to automatically enforce security policies on systems specified using ACP . Indeed, we need simply to
write the enforced system using the embedded enforcement operator of ACPφ and to translate it to
its equivalent in ACP .
This paper is structured as follows. We start by the related work in Section 2. Section 3 presents
the language used for specifying security policies. Section 4 describes the syntax and the semantics
of our calculus used for specifying concurrent programs. In Section 5, we present a formal framework
allowing to enforce security policies on concurrent programs. Section 6 gives themain theoremstating
the correctness of our method. Section 7 illustrates the approach by an example. Finally, we provide
some concluding remark in Section 8.
2. Related work
Many promising formal frameworks for automatic enforcement of security policies in programs
have been proposed during the last years. Their goal is to ensure that a program respects a given
security policy which generally specifies acceptable executions of the program and can be expressed
in terms of access control problems, information flow, availability of resources, confidentiality, etc.
(Schneider, 2000). The literature records various techniques for enforcing security policies belonging
to mainly two principal classes: static approaches including typing theory (Morrisett et al., 1999),
Proof Carrying Code (Necula, 1997), and dynamic approaches including reference monitors (Bauer
et al., 2002; Ligatti et al., 2005; Martinell and Matteucci, 2007), Java stack inspection (Erlingsson and
Schneider, 2000). Static analysis aims at enforcing properties before program execution. In dynamic
analysis, however, the enforcement takes place at run time by intercepting critical events during the
program execution and halting the latter whenever an action is attempting to violate the property
being enforced. Recently, several researchers have explored rewriting techniques (Hamlen et al., 2003)
in order to gather advantages of both static and dynamic methods. The idea consists in modifying a
program statically, so that the produced version respects the requested requirements. The rewritten
program is generated from the original one by adding, when necessary, some tests at some critical
points to obtain the desired behaviors.
The first significant effort in the study of Execution Monitoring (EM) security enforcement is
presented by Schneider (2000). The important contribution of Schneider (2000) is the characterization
of EM-enforceable security policies by security automata. The EMs considered by Schneider are
enforcementmechanisms thatwork bymonitoring the execution of untrusted programs and interrupt
themwhenever execution is about to violate the security policy being enforced. Starting from thework
of Schneider described above, Ligatti et al. (2005) have defined another version of security automata.
They introduced edit automata which are transformers on the program action stream, rather than
simple recognizers.
Examples of formal works related to the rewriting of sequential programs are numerous and some
of them can be found in Langar and Mejri (2005), Langar et al. (2010) , Ligatti et al. (2005), Mejri
and Fujita (2008) and Hakima et al. (2009). However, only few attempts have targeted concurrent
programs. This is due to the complexity added by the parallelism operator. Even simple systems
become widely complicated when they are executed in parallel (Fokkink, 2000).
3. BPA∗δ,1: the specification language of security policy
We start by giving the syntax and the semantics of BPA∗δ,1, the language that will be used to specify
security policies. Since in the proposed enforcement approach we transform the security policy to a
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Table 2
Semantics of BPA∗δ,1 .
(Ra) 
a
a−→ 1
(R.r )
P
a−→ P ′
P.Q
a−→ P ′.Q
(R+l )
P
a−→ P ′
P + Q a−→ P ′
(R+r )
Q
a−→ Q ′
P + Q a−→ Q ′
(R∗l )
P
a−→ P ′
P∗Q a−→ P ′.(P∗Q )
(R∗r )
Q
a−→ Q ′
P∗Q a−→ Q ′
monitor, we reach immediately this goal by choosing BPA∗δ,1 since it is a subset of ACPφ the language
used to specify programs.
3.1. Syntax of BPA∗δ,1
The syntax of BPA∗δ,1 is presented by the BNF grammar in Table 1, where a is an action in a given
finite set A, 1 and δ are two constants representing respectively the successful termination and the
deadlock. Furthermore, the operator ‘‘.’’ represents the sequential composition: P1.P2 is the process
that first executes P1 until it terminates, and then P2 starts. The operator ‘‘+’’ represents the alternative
composition: P1 + P2 is the process that either executes P1 or P2 but not both of them. The operator
‘‘∗’’ represents the iteration. It is a binary version of the Kleene star operator (Bergstra and Ponse,
2001): P∗1 P2 is the process that behaves like P1.(P
∗
1 P2)+ P2. In what follows, we denote by Pφ the set
of processes generated by BPA∗δ,1.
3.2. Semantics of BPA∗δ,1
The operational semantics of BPA∗δ,1 is defined by the transition relation−→∈ Pφ×A×Pφ shown
in Table 2.
3.3. Shortcuts
For the sake of simplicity, we use in what follows the following shortcuts:
A .=
−
a∈A
a
−A .= A− A
−a .= A− {a}
− .= A− ∅
ϕω
.= ϕ∗δ
where A is a subset ofA, a ∈ A and ‘‘ .=’’ is the abbreviation symbol. It should be clear form the context
when A is a set of atomic actions and A is a process.
3.4. Example
Hereafter, we specify various security properties using BPA∗δ,1.
• (−send)ω: this property states that a program should never executes action send.
• (−read)∗(read.(−send)ω): this process represents a security property which prohibits a send
operation after a read has been executed.
4. Program specification
In this section, we present the formal language that we use to specify concurrent programs. It is
a modified version of ACP (Algebra of Communicating Processes) (Baeten, 2005). Process algebra is a
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Table 3
Syntax of ACPφ .
P ::= 1 (Constant representing successful termination )
| δ (Constant representing deadlock)
| a (Atomic action)
| P1.P2 (Sequential composition)
| P1 + P2 (Non-deterministic choice or sum)
| P1||γ P2 (Merge, parallel composition)
| P1TP2 (left merge)
| P1|γ P2 (Communication merge)
| P∗1 P2 (Iteration operator)
| ∂H (P) (Encapsulation operator, H ⊆ A)
| τI (P) (Abstraction operator, I ⊆ A)
| ∂Pϕ (P) (Enforcement operator)
powerful language for specifying and studying concurrent systems. It provides a modular tool for the
high-level description of interactions, communications and synchronizations between a collection
of processes. The new proposed algebra is denoted by ACPφ and has the particularity of explicitly
handling the monitoring concept through its operator ∂Pϕ . In fact, the process ∂Pϕ (P) can execute only
the actions that could be executed by the controller Pϕ .
4.1. Syntax
The syntax of ACPφ is presented by the BNF grammar given in Table 3. Note that themerge operator
||γ and the communication operator |γ are parameterized by a communication function γ defined as
shown hereafter:
Definition 4.1 (Communication Function). A communication function is any commutative and
associative function formA×A toA, i.e.: γ : A×A→ A is a communication function if:
(1) ∀a, b ∈ A,: γ (a, b) = γ (b, a), and
(2) ∀a, b, c ∈ A: γ (γ (a, b), c) = γ (a, γ (b, c)).
Constants 1 and δ, atomic actions, operators ‘‘.’’, ‘‘+’’ and ‘‘*’’ have the same semantic as shown
for Lϕ . The merge operator ‘‘||γ ’’ represents the parallel composition: P1||γ P2 is the process that
executes P1 and P2 in parallel with the possibility of synchronization according to the function γ .
Notice that the function γ can change from one composition to another. For instance, (P1|γ1P2)|γ2P3
is a valid process, where γ1 ≠ γ2. The left merge operator ‘‘Tγ ’’ has the same meaning as the merge
operator, but with the restriction that the first step must come from the left process: P1Tγ P2 is the
process that first executes an action in P1 and then run the remaining part of P1 in parallel with P2.
The communication operator ‘‘|γ ’’ represents a synchronized composition (communication between
processes). Thus, P1|γ P2 represents the merge of two processes P1 and P2 with the restriction that
the first step is a communication between P1 and P2. The unary operator ‘‘∂H ’’ represents a restriction
operator, where H ⊆ A: the process ∂H(P) can evolve only by executing actions that are not in H . The
unary operator ‘‘τI ’’ represents the abstraction operator, where I is any set of atomic actions called
internal actions: it abstracts all output action in I by the silent action τ . Finally, the operator ‘‘∂Pϕ ’’,
where Pϕ is a BPA∗δ,1 process, represents our enforcement operator: ∂Pϕ (P) is the processes that can
evolve only if P can evolve by an action that does not immediately lead to the violation of the security
policy Pϕ . In what follows, we denote by P the set of processes generated by ACPφ .
4.2. Semantics
The operational semantics of ACPφ is defined by the transition relation−→∈ P ×A× P shown
in Table 5, where the relation ‘‘≡’’ is defined in Table 4.
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Table 4
Axioms of ACPφ .
P + Q ≡ Q + P (A1) P||γQ ≡ Q ||γ P (A2)
P|γQ ≡ Q |γ P (A3) 1.P ≡ P (A6)
Table 5
Operational semantics of ACPφ .
(R≡) P ≡ P1 P1
a−→ P2 P2 ≡ Q
P
a−→ Q
(Ra) 
a
a−→ 1
(R.) P
a−→ P ′
P.Q
a−→ P ′.Q
(R+) P
a−→ P ′
P + Q a−→ P ′
(R∗) P
a−→ P ′
P∗Q a−→ P ′.(P∗Q )
(Rd∗)
Q
a−→ Q ′
P∗Q a−→ Q ′
(RTγ ) P
a−→ P ′
PTγQ a−→ P ′||γQ
(R||γ )
P
a−→ P ′
P||γQ a−→ P ′1||γ P2
(RC||γ )
P
a−→ P ′ Q b−→ Q ′
P||γQ γ (a, b)−→ P ′||γQ ′
γ (a, b) ≠ δ
(R|γ )
P
a−→ P ′ Q b−→ Q ′
P|γQ γ (a, b)−→ P ′||γQ ′
γ (a, b) ≠ δ (Rφτ ) P
a−→ P ′
τI (P)
τ−→ τI (P ′)
a ∈ I
(Rτ ) P
a−→ P ′
τI (P)
a−→ τI (P)
a ∉ I (R∂H ) P
a−→ P ′
∂H (P)
a−→ ∂H (P ′)
a ∉ H
(R∂Pϕ )
P
a−→ P ′ Pϕ a−→ P ′ϕ
∂Pϕ (P)
a−→ ∂P ′ϕ (P ′)
a ≠ τ (Rτ∂Pϕ ) P
τ−→ P ′
∂Pϕ (P)
τ−→ ∂Pϕ (P ′)
5. Formal enforcement of security policies
The principal goal of this research is to define a formal framework allowing to enforce security
policies on concurrent programs. To achieve this goal, we used Basic Process Algebra which is suitable
for the specification of our targeted class of security policies. In addition, we defined a new version of
ACP calculus enhanced with an enforcement operator. Given a program P and a security policy Pϕ the
desired enforcement can be achieved using the enforcement operator ∂Pϕ (P). Indeed, the operational
semantics of ∂Pϕ is defined in such a way that P executes only actions that are allowed by Pϕ . In other
words, we have:
P ⊗ ϕ = ∂Pϕ (P).
Some of the important features of the enforcement operator is that it allows us to enforce locally
a given security policy e.g.: P.∂Pϕ (Q ), P | ∂Pϕ (Q ), etc. This allows to reduce the overhead induced
by the monitoring when the untrusted part of the system are known. Besides, the enforcement
operator allows us to enforce different policies in different parts of the system, e.g. ∂P ′ϕ (P).∂Pϕ (Q ),
∂P ′ϕ (P) | ∂Pϕ (Q ), etc.
5.1. ACPφ expressivity
The principal difference between the introduced process algebra (ACPφ) and the original one (ACP),
is the introduction of the enforcement operator ∂Pϕ . In this section we prove that the enforcement
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operator does not bring any additional expressivity to ACPφ since it can be expressed as a combination
of the standard operators of ACP . Besides its importance from the theoretical point of view, this result
gives us a practical, efficient and elegant way to implement our enforcement operator. Basically, the
idea consists of transforming the security policy as a process that runs in parallel with the system. The
controlled systemwill be modified by adding some synchronization actions so that it can evolve only
when the requested action is allowed by the security policy.
5.1.1. Synchronization actions
The idea of transforming a security policy to a process that monitor the system is achieved via
the introduction of what we call synchronization actions (commonly used in synchronization logic).
The original version of the process is rewritten so that its actions will be controlled and approved
by an execution monitor extracted form the security policy that we want to enforce. Let us clarify
the idea by a simple example. Suppose that the process is a + b and the security policy is Pϕ = a
which mean that only the action a is allowed. To monitor the process, the security policy will be
transformed to a process containing only synchronization actions where each action x is replaced
by a sequence of two actions xd.xf used to capture the start and the end of the action x. Therefore,
the security policy a will be transformed to the monitor ad.af . The process, on the other side, will be
modified so that it will ask for permission before executing any action. More precisely, any action x
of the process will be substituted by xd.x.xf so that it can be executed only when the control action xd
could synchronize with xd of themonitor (i.e. themonitor allows the action). For example, the process
a+ bwill be transformed to ad.a.af + bd.b.bf . Now, when the two processes are executed in parallel
(ad.a.af + bd.b.bf ) |γ ad.af they can communicate (synchronize) on their synchronization actions if
γ allows it. In order to really enforce the security policy, we need to force the synchronization using
the ∂H i.e.: ∂H((ad.a.af + bd.b.bf ) |γ ad.af ), where H = {ad, af , bd, bf , ad, af }. Finally, we clean the
output stream of the process by abstracting the communication on synchronization actions by the
silent action τ as follows: ∂H(τI((ad.a.af + bd.b.bf ) |γ ad.af )), where I = {γ (ad, ad), γ (af , af )}. To
sum up, ∂H(τI((ad.a.af + bd.b.bf ) |γ ad.af )) is the enforced version of the process a+ b by the security
policy a.
To formalize, this idea, we need to introduce the following notations:
• Given a set of actions A, its corresponding synchronization set, denoted by C(A) is:
C(A) =

a∈A
{ad, af , ad, af }.
• Given a process P , we denote by C(P) the set of its synchronization actions.
• Given an atomic action a ∈ A, we denote by ac the set:−
α∈A\{a}
α.
• Given an integer i and a set of action A, we denote by Ai the set containing the actions of A indexed
by i.
• Given an integer i and a set of action A, we denote by Ii the set:
α∈Ai
{α|α¯}.
• The function γ0 will be used to denote the communication function defined as follows:
γ0(a, a¯) =

a|a¯ if a ∈ A ∪ C(A)
δ else.
5.1.2. Creating the monitor
Synchronization actions are introduced in a controller process by the function ⌈|−|⌉ defined in
Table 6.
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Table 6
BPA∗δ,1 processes translation function.
⌈|−|⌉ : BPA∗δ,1 × N→ ACPφ
⌈|1|⌉i = 1
⌈|δ|⌉i = δ
⌈|a|⌉i = aid.aif⌈|Pϕ1 .Pϕ2 |⌉i = ⌈|Pϕ1 |⌉i.⌈|Pϕ2 |⌉i⌈|Pϕ1 + Pϕ2 |⌉i = ⌈|Pϕ1 |⌉i + ⌈|Pϕ2 |⌉i⌈|P∗ϕ1Pϕ2 |⌉i = ⌈|Pϕ1 |⌉i∗⌈|Pϕ2 |⌉i
Table 7
ACPφ processes translation function.
⌈−⌉ : ACPΦ × N× 2A → ACPΦ
⌈1⌉Hi = 1⌈δ⌉Hi = δ
⌈a⌉Hi =

a If a ∈ H ∪ {τ }
aid.a.a
i
f Else
⌈P1.P2⌉Hi = ⌈P1⌉Hi .⌈P2⌉Hi
⌈P1 + P2⌉Hi = ⌈P1⌉Hi + ⌈P2⌉Hi
⌈P∗1 P2⌉Hi = ⌈P1⌉Hi ∗⌈P2⌉Hi
⌈P1||γ0P2⌉Hi = ⌈P1⌉Hi ||γ0⌈P2⌉Hi
⌈P1TP2⌉Hi = ⌈P1⌉Hi T⌈P2⌉Hi
⌈P1|P2⌉Hi = ⌈P1⌉Hi |⌈P2⌉Hi
⌈∂H ′ (P)⌉Hi = ∂H ′ (⌈P⌉H∪H ′i )
⌈τI (P)⌉Hi = τI (⌈P⌉H∪Ii )
⌈∂Pϕ (P)⌉Hi = ∂Hi (τIi (⌈P⌉Hi ||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i))
5.1.3. Adding synchronization actions to the controlled processes
Synchronization actions are added in the controlled process by the function ⌈−⌉Hi defined in Table 7
where:
• H is a set of trusted function inA representing trusted actions. Amongst others, the parameter H
is introduced to avoid the control of synchronization actions. This situation appear when we have
more then one security policy. For example, suppose that we want to enforce both Pϕ1 = a and
Pϕ2 = a.c on P = a.b||γ c.d. To this end, we should execute the process ∂Pϕ1 (∂Pϕ2 (P)), which is
transformed to the process ⌈∂Pϕ2 (⌈∂Pϕ1 (P)⌉i)⌉
H1
i+1 where H1 is the set of synchronization actions
added to P after the first transformation, i.e. H1 = C(⌈∂Pϕ1 (P)⌉i)where ⌈−⌉i is a shortcut of ⌈−⌉∅i .
If H1 is removed, the outer transformation will add synchronization actions to ‘‘synchronization
actions’’ and the resulting process will not be able to evolve.
• i is an integer used to ensure the freshness of synchronization actions.
Processes 1 and δ are invariant. Every, action not in H is transformed to aid.a.a
i
f . Encapsulated and
abstracted actions will not be controlled since they are internal actions (they cannot be seen from
outside).
5.1.4. Enforced version ∂Pϕ (P)
Now, we are ready to express the enforcement operator using the standard ACP operators.
Indeed, we will prove in the next section that the process ∂Pϕ (P) is ‘‘equivalent’’ to the process
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i)) for any integer i.
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6. Main result
The purpose of this section is to prove that enforcement process can be specified in ACP . The initial
version of the process in ACPφ and its corresponding version in ACP are equivalent with respect to the
τ -bissimulation defined hereafter.
Definition 6.1 (τ -bissimulation). A binary relation S ⊆ P ×P over processes is a τ -bissimulation, if
for all (P,Q ) in S we have:
(i) If P
a
 P ′ then Q a Q ′ and (P ′,Q ′) ∈ S, and
(ii) If Q
a
 Q ′ then P a P ′ and (Q ′, P ′) ∈ S
where
a
= ( τ→)∗ a→ ( τ→)∗.
Definition 6.2 (↔τ ). We define↔τ as the biggest τ -bissimulation:
↔τ =

{S : S is a τ -bissimulation}.
Finally, the following theorem proves the equivalence between the enforcement operator and its
transformed form.
Theorem 6.3 (Soundness). ∀P ∈ ACPφ , ∀Pϕ ∈ BPA∗δ,1, we have:
∂Pϕ (P)↔τ ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i))
for any i ∈ N.
6.1. Proof of soundness
Definition 6.4 (Natural Order). Let be P and Q two processes inP . We say that P is naturally smaller
then Q , denoted P ⊑N Q if the following condition is satisfied:
P + Q = Q .
Proposition 6.5. Let be P and Q two processes in Pφ . The BPA∗δ,1 process translation function preserves
the natural order over processes:
Pϕ ⊑N P ′ϕ ⇔ ⌈|Pϕ |⌉i ⊑N ⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i,
for any i ∈ N.
Proof.
Pϕ ⊑N P ′ϕ
⇔ {| Definition of⊑N since Pφ ⊂ P |}
Pϕ + P ′ϕ = P ′ϕ
⇔ {| Application of translation function ⌈||⌉i |}
⌈|Pϕ + P ′ϕ |⌉i = ⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i
⇔ {| Table 6 : ⌈|Pϕ1 + Pϕ2 |⌉i = ⌈|Pϕ1 |⌉i + ⌈|Pϕ2 |⌉i |}
⌈|Pϕ |⌉i + ⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i = ⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i
⇔ {| Definition of⊑N |}
⌈|Pϕ |⌉i ⊑N ⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i. 
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Proposition 6.6. Let be P and Q two processes inP . The ACPφ process translation function preserves the
natural order over processes:
P ⊑N Q ⇔ ⌈P⌉i ⊑N ⌈Q ⌉i,
for any i ∈ N.
Proof.
P ⊑N Q
⇔ {| Definition of⊑N |}
P + Q = Q
⇔ {| Application of transformation function ⌈⌉i |}
⌈P + Q ⌉i = ⌈Q ⌉i
⇔ {| Table 7 : ⌈P + Q ⌉i = ⌈P⌉i + ⌈Q ⌉i |}
⌈P⌉i + ⌈Q ⌉i = ⌈Q ⌉i
⇔ {| Definition of⊑N |}
⌈P⌉i ⊑N ⌈Q ⌉i. 
Definition 6.7 (Notation). ∀P ∈ P and ∀a ∈ A, we define P ↓ a by:
P ↓ a ⇔ ∃Q |P a−→ Q .
We extend the definition of ↓ over a sequence σ ∈ A∗ as follow:
P ↓ σ ⇔ ∃Q |P σ Q .
Proposition 6.8. ∀P, P ′ ∈ P and ∀a ∈ A we have:
P
a−→ P ′ ⇔ ⌈P⌉i
aid.a.a
i
f
 ⌈P ′⌉i
for any i ∈ N.
Proof.
P
a−→ P ′
⇔ {| Definition of⊑N |}
a.P ′ ⊑N P
⇔ {| Proposition 6.6 |}
⌈a.P ′⌉i ⊑N ⌈P⌉i
⇔ {| Table 7 : ⌈P.Q ⌉i = ⌈P⌉i.⌈Q ⌉i |}
⌈a⌉i.⌈P ′⌉i ⊑N ⌈P⌉i
⇔ {| Table 7: rule ⌈a⌉i |}
aid.a.a
i
f .⌈P ′⌉i ⊑N ⌈P⌉i
⇔ {| Definition of⊑N |}
⌈P⌉i
aid.a.a
i
f
 ⌈P ′⌉i. 
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Proposition 6.9. ∀Pϕ, P ′ϕ ∈ Pφ and ∀a ∈ A we have:
Pϕ
a−→ P ′ϕ ⇔ ⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
aid.a
i
f
 ⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i
for any i ∈ N.
Proof.
Pϕ
a−→ P ′ϕ
⇔ {| Definition of⊑N since Pφ ⊆ P |}
a.P ′ϕ ⊑N Pϕ
⇔ {| Proposition 6.6 |}
⌈|a.P ′ϕ |⌉i ⊑N ⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
⇔ {| Table 6 : ⌈|P.Q |⌉i = ⌈|P|⌉i.⌈|Q |⌉i |}
⌈|a|⌉i.⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i ⊑N ⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
⇔ {| Table 6: rule ⌈|a|⌉i |}
aid.a
i
f .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i ⊑N ⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
⇔ {| Definition of⊑N |}
⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
aid.a
i
f
 ⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i. 
Proposition 6.10. ∀P, P ′ ∈ P we have:
P
τ−→ P ′ ⇔ ⌈P⌉i τ−→ ⌈P ′⌉i,
for any i ∈ N.
Proof.
P
τ−→ P ′
⇔ {| Definition of⊑N |}
τ .P ′ ⊑N P
⇔ {| Proposition 6.6 |}
⌈τ .P ′⌉i ⊑N ⌈P⌉i
⇔ {| Table 7 : ⌈P.Q ⌉i = ⌈P⌉i.⌈Q ⌉i |}
⌈τ⌉i.⌈P ′⌉i ⊑N ⌈P⌉i
⇔ {| Table 7 : ⌈τ⌉i = τ |}
τ .⌈P ′⌉i ⊑N ⌈P⌉i
⇔ {| Definition of⊑N |}
⌈P⌉i τ−→ ⌈P ′⌉i. 
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Proposition 6.11. ∀P, P ′ ∈ P and ∀Pϕ, P ′ϕ ∈ Pφ we have:
∂Pϕ (P)
a−→ ∂P ′ϕ (P ′) ⇔

P
a−→ P ′
Pϕ
a−→ P ′ϕ .
Proof.
∂Pϕ (P)
a−→ ∂P ′ϕ (P ′)
⇔ {| Rule R∂Pϕ of Table 5 |}
P
a−→ P ′
Pϕ
a−→ P ′ϕ . 
Proposition 6.12. ∀P, P ′ ∈ P and ∀Pϕ, P ′ϕ ∈ Pφ we have:
∂Pϕ (P)
a−→ ∂P ′ϕ (P ′) ⇔

⌈P⌉i
aid.a.a
i
f
 ⌈P ′⌉i
⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
aid.a
i
f
 ⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i
for any i ∈ N.
Proof.
∂Pϕ (P)
a−→ ∂P ′ϕ (P ′)
⇔ {| Proposition 6.11 |}
P
a−→ P ′
Pϕ
a−→ P ′ϕ⇔ {| Propositions 6.8 and 6.9 |} ⌈P⌉i
aid.a.a
i
f
 ⌈P ′⌉i
⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
aid.a
i
f
 ⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i. 
Proposition 6.13. ∀P, P ′ ∈ P and ∀Pϕ ∈ Pφ we have:
∂Pϕ (P)
τ∗
 ∂Pϕ (P
′) ⇔ P τ∗ P ′.
Proof.
P
τ∗
 P ′
⇔ {| Definition of |}
P
τ−→ P ′′ ∧ P ′′ τ∗ P ′
⇔ {| Rule Rτ∂Pϕ of Table 5 |}
∂Pϕ (P)
τ−→ ∂Pϕ (P ′′) ∧ P ′′ τ
∗
 P ′
⇔ {| Repeat the above steps and Definition of |}
∂Pϕ (P)
τ∗
 ∂Pϕ (P
′). 
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Proposition 6.14. ∀P, P ′ ∈ P and ∀Pϕ, P ′ϕ ∈ Pφ we have:
∂Pϕ (P)
a
 ∂P ′ϕ (P
′) ⇔
 ⌈P⌉i
aid.a.a
i
f
 ⌈P ′⌉i
⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
aid.a
i
f
 ⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i
for any i ∈ N.
Proof.
∂Pϕ (P)
a
 ∂P ′ϕ (P
′)
⇔ {| Definition of |}
∂Pϕ (P)
τ∗
 ∂Pϕ (P1)
a−→ ∂P ′ϕ (P2)
τ∗
 ∂P ′ϕ (P
′)
⇔ {| Proposition 6.13 |}
∂Pϕ (P)
τ∗
 ∂Pϕ (P1)
a−→ ∂P ′ϕ (P2)
τ∗
 ∂P ′ϕ (P
′)
P
τ∗
 P1
P2
τ∗
 P ′
⇔ {| Proposition 6.10 |}
∂Pϕ (P)
τ∗
 ∂Pϕ (P1)
a−→ ∂P ′ϕ (P2)
τ∗
 ∂P ′ϕ (P
′)
⌈P⌉i τ
∗
 ⌈P1⌉i
⌈P2⌉i τ
∗
 ⌈P ′⌉i
⇔ {| Proposition 6.12 |} ⌈P⌉i
τ∗
 ⌈P1⌉i
aid.a.a
i
f
 ⌈P2⌉i τ
∗
 ⌈P ′⌉i
⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
aid.a
i
f
 ⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i⇔ {| Definition of |} ⌈P⌉i
aid.a.a
i
f
 ⌈P ′⌉i
⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
aid.a
i
f
 ⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i. 
Proposition 6.15. ∀P, P ′ ∈ P and ∀Pϕ, P ′ϕ ∈ Pφ .
If ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i))  
S
a
 ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P ′⌉i||γ0⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))  
T
, then we have:
(1) S ↓ τ ∗aτ ∗ and a is not a control action: a ∉ C(A)
(2) ⌈P⌉i ↓ σ .a
(3) ⌈P⌉i ↓ σ ′.aid.a
(4) ⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
aid−→ aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i
(5) if S perform a τ step, then:
5.1 ⌈P⌉i perform a τ step, or
5.2 ⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i will be synchronized executing an action from Ii
(6) ⌈P⌉i ↓ σ ′.aid.a.aif
for any i ∈ N.
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Proof. Case 1.
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i))  
S
a
 ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P ′⌉i||γ0⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))  
T⇒ {| Definition of |}
S ↓ τ ∗aτ ∗
⇒ {| Form of S: definition of ∂Hi and set Hi |}
S ↓ τ ∗aτ ∗ and a ∉ C(A).
Case 2.
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i))  
S
a
 ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P ′⌉i||γ0⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))  
T⇒ {| Case 1 |}
S ↓ τ ∗a and a ∉ C(A)
⇒ {| Form of S |} Case 1 ⌈P⌉i ↓ σ .a
Case 2 ⌈|Pϕ |⌉i ↓ σ .a
Case 3 ⌈P⌉i|γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i ↓ a⇒ {| Definition of ⌈||⌉i : ⌈|Pϕ |⌉i is formed only by control actions |} Case 1 ⌈P⌉i ↓ σ .a
Case 2 Impossible: ⌈|Pϕ |⌉i cannot execute a ∉ C(A)
Case 3 ⌈P⌉i|γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i ↓ a⇒ {| ⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i is under the scope of τIi operator and definitions of γ0, Ii |} Case 1 ⌈P⌉i ↓ σ .a
Case 3 Impossible : every synchronization action, γ0(ap, aPϕ )
between ⌈P⌉i and ⌈|Pϕ |⌉i belongs to Ii
⇒ {| Conclusion |}
⌈P⌉i ↓ σ .a.
Case 3.
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i))  
S
a
 ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P ′⌉i||γ0⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))  
T⇒ {| Case 2 |}
⌈P⌉i ↓ σ .a
⇒ {| Definition of ⌈⌉i: Actions of P transformed to aid.a.aif |}
⌈P⌉i ↓ σ ′.aid.a.
Case 4.
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i))  
S
a
 ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P ′⌉i||γ0⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))  
T⇒ {| Case 3 |}
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⌈P⌉i ↓ σ ′.aid.a
⇒ {| Case 2 and ⌈P⌉i is under the scope of ∂Hi operator |} ⌈P⌉i ↓ σ ′.aid.a⌈P⌉i should synchronize with another process to be able to execute aid⇒ {| Form of S |} ⌈P⌉i ↓ σ ′.aid.a⌈P⌉i should synchronize with ⌈|Pϕ |⌉i to be able to execute aid⇒ {| Definition of ⌈||⌉i |}
⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
aid−→ aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i.
Case 5.
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i))  
S
τ−→ Q
⇒ {| Definition of Ii and operators τIi and ∂Hi |}
Case 1 ⌈P⌉i synchronizes internally and follow a τ step
Case 2 ⌈|Pϕ |⌉i follow a τ step
Case 3 ⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i synchronizes by executing an action from Ii⇒ {| Definition of ⌈||⌉i: Case 2 impossible |}
5.1 ⌈P⌉i synchronizes internally and follow a τ step
5.2 ⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i synchronizes by executing an action from Ii.
Case 6.
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i))
a
 ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P ′⌉i||γ0⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
⇒ {| Case 3 |}
⌈P⌉i ↓ σ ′.aid.a
⇒ {| Actions of P transformed to aid.a.aif , Case 4 and S
τ∗aτ∗
 T |}
⌈P⌉i ↓ σ ′.aid.a.aif . 
Lemma 6.16. ∀P, P ′ ∈ P and ∀Pϕ, P ′ϕ ∈ Pφ we have:
∂Pϕ (P)
a
 ∂P ′ϕ (P
′) ⇔ ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P ′⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i))
a
 ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
for any i ∈ N.
Proof.
 ⇒
∂Pϕ (P)
a
 ∂P ′ϕ (P
′)
⇒ {| Proposition 6.14 |}
⌈P⌉i
aid.a.a
i
f
 ⌈P ′⌉i
⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
aid.a
i
f
 ⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i
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⇒ {| Definition of |} ⌈P⌉i
aid−→ P1 a−→ P2
aif−→ ⌈P ′⌉i
⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
aid−→ aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i
⇒ {| Rule RC||γ0 |}
P1
a−→ P2
aif−→ ⌈P ′⌉i
⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
aid−→ aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i
⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
aid|aid−→ P1||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i
⇒ {| Rule Rφτ where aid|aid ∈ Ii |}
P1
a−→ P2
aif−→ ⌈P ′⌉i
⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
aid−→ aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i
τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i) τ−→ τIi(P1||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i)⇒ {| Rule R∂H where τ ∉ Hi |}
P1
a−→ P2
aif−→ ⌈P ′⌉i
⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
aid−→ aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i)) τ−→ ∂Hi(τIi(P1||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
⇒ {| P1 a−→ P2 and rule R||γ0 |}
P2
aif−→ ⌈P ′⌉i
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i)) τ−→ ∂Hi(τIi(P1||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
P1||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i a−→ P2||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i
⇒ {| Rule Rφτ where a ∉ Ii |}
P2
aif−→ ⌈P ′⌉i
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i)) τ−→ ∂Hi(τIi(P1||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
τIi(P1||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i) a−→ τIi(P2||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i)⇒ {| Rule R∂H and a ∉ Hi |}
P2
aif−→ ⌈P ′⌉i
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i)) τ−→ ∂Hi(τIi(P1||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
∂Hi(τIi(P1||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i)) a−→ ∂Hi(τIi(P2||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
⇒ {| Rule RC||γ0 |}
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i)) τ−→ ∂Hi(τIi(P1||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
∂Hi(τIi(P1||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i)) a−→ ∂Hi(τIi(P2||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
P2||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i τ−→ ⌈P ′⌉i||γ0⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i
⇒ {| Rule Rφτ where aif |aif ∈ Ii |}
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∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i)) τ−→ ∂Hi(τIi(P1||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
∂Hi(τIi(P1||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i)) a−→ ∂Hi(τIi(P2||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
τIi(P2||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i) τ−→ τIi(⌈P ′⌉i||γ0⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i)⇒ {| Rule R∂H where τ ∉ Hi |}
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i)) τ−→ ∂Hi(τIi(P1||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
∂Hi(τIi(P1||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i)) a−→ ∂Hi(τIi(P2||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
∂Hi(τIi(P2||γ0aif .⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i)) τ−→ ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P ′⌉i||γ0⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))⇒ {| Definition of |}
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i))
a
 ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P ′⌉i||γ0⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
 ⇐
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i))
a
 ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P ′⌉i||γ0⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
⇒ {| Definition of a |}
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i))
τ∗aτ∗
 ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P ′⌉i||γ0⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
⇒ {| Proposition 6.15, Case 6 |}
∃P ′ ∈ P : ⌈P⌉i
σ .aid.a.a
i
f
 ⌈P ′⌉i
⇒ {| Proposition 6.15, Case 5.1 |}
∃P ′,Q ∈ P : ⌈P⌉i τ
∗
 ⌈Q ⌉i
aid.a.a
i
f
 ⌈P ′⌉i
⇒ {| Propositions 6.10 and 6.13 |} ∃P ′,Q ∈ P : ⌈P⌉i τ
∗
 ⌈Q ⌉i
aid.a.a
i
f
 ⌈P ′⌉i
∂Pϕ (P)
τ∗
 ∂Pϕ (Q )⇒ {| Proposition 6.8 |}
Q
a−→ P ′
∂Pϕ (P)
τ∗
 ∂Pϕ (Q )⇒ {| Proposition 6.15, Case 4 |}
Q
a−→ P ′
∂Pϕ (P)
τ∗
 ∂Pϕ (Q )
⌈|Pϕ |⌉i
aid.a
i
f
 ⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i⇒ {| Proposition 6.9 |}
Q
a−→ P ′
Pϕ
a−→ P ′ϕ
∂Pϕ (P)
τ∗
 ∂Pϕ (Q )⇒ {| Rule R∂Pϕ |} ∂Pϕ (Q )
a−→ ∂P ′ϕ (P ′)
∂Pϕ (P)
τ∗
 ∂Pϕ (Q )
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⇒ {| Definition of a |}
∂Pϕ (P)
a
 ∂P ′ϕ (P
′). 
6.1.1. Proof of Theorem 6.3
We will prove that the set of all couple of the form (∂Pϕ (P), ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i))) is a τ -
bissimulation, i.e., 
P∈P ,Pϕ∈Pφ
{∂Pϕ (P), ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i))}
 ⊆ ↔τ .
We have just to prove that any couple of this set, always evolves to another couple in the same
set.
Case i:
∂Pϕ (P)
a
 ∂Pϕ (P
′)
⇒ {| Lemma 6.16 |}
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i))
a
 ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P ′⌉i||γ0⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
Case ii:
∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i))
a
 ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P ′⌉i||γ0⌈|P ′ϕ |⌉i))
⇒ {| Lemma 6.16 |}
∂Pϕ (P)
a
 ∂Pϕ (P
′). 
7. Example
Hereafter we show how our techniques works on a simple example. Consider the following
program:
P = read.copy||γ0open.transform||γ0write.send.
Which is composed of two concurrent processes, and the following security property:
Pϕ : (−read)∗(read.(−send)ω).
In order to enforce Pϕ on the program P , we should execute the process:
∂Pϕ (read.copy||γ0write.send).
Which is equivalent to execute the process:
∂H0(τI0(⌈read.copy||γ0write.send⌉||γ0⌈|(−read)∗(read.(−send)ω)|⌉))
where H0 = C(A)1 and I0 =α∈H0{α|α¯}, where A = {read, copy, write, send}.
In order to simplify the presentation, the letter c denotes copy, the letter r denotes read, the letter
w denoteswrite and the letter s denotes send.
Firstly, we should calculate ⌈r.c||γ0w.s⌉ and ⌈|(−r)∗(r.(−s)ω)|⌉:⌈r.c||γ0w.s⌉ = rd.r.rf .cd.c.cf ||γ0wd.w.wf .sd.s.sf⌈|(−r)∗(r.(−s)ω)|⌉ = (rdc .r f c)∗(rd.rf .(sdc .sf c)ω).
We obtain the following process:
∂H0(τI0((rd.r.rf .cd.c.cf ||γ0wd.w.wf .sd.s.sf )||γ0 (rdc .r f c)∗(rd.rf .(sdc .sf c)ω)  
φt
)).
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For example developing the following sequence of actions: read.write.send. Note that this sequence
violates the property Pϕ , and the program should be blocked before executing the action send.
∂H0(τI0((rd.r.rf .cd.c.cf ||γ0wd.w.wf .sd.s.sf )||γ0(rdc .r f c)∗(rd.rf .(sdc .sf c)ω)))
τ−→ {| Rules RC||γ , Rφτ and R∂H where γ0(rd, rd) = rd|rd ∈ I0 |}
∂H0(τI0((r.rf .cd.c.cf ||γ0wd.w.wf .sd.s.sf )||γ0 rf .(sdc .sf c)ω))
r−→ {| Rules R||γ , Rτ and R∂H where r ∉ I0 |}
∂H0(τI0((rf .cd.c.cf ||γ0wd.w.wf .sd.s.sf )||γ0 rf .(sdc .sf c)ω))
τ−→ {| Rules RC||γ , Rφτ and R∂H where γ0(rf , r f ) = rf |r f ∈ I0 |}
∂H0(τI0((cd.c.cf ||γ0wd.w.wf .sd.s.sf )||γ0sdc .sf c .(sdc .sf c)ω))
τ−→ {| Rules RC||γ , Rφτ and R∂H where γ0(wd, sdc) = wd|sdc ∈ I0 |}
∂H0(τI0((cd.c.cf ||γ0w.wf .sd.s.sf )||γ0sf c .(sdc .sf c)ω))
w−→ {| Rules R||γ , Rτ and R∂H where r ∉ I0 |}
∂H0(τI0((cd.c.cf ||γ0wf .sd.s.sf )||γ0 > sf c .(sdc .sf c)ω))
τ−→ {| Rules RC||γ , Rφτ and R∂H where γ0(wf , sf c) = wf |sf c ∈ I0 |}
∂H0(τI0((cd.c.cf ||γ0sd.s.sf )||γ0(sdc .sf c)ω)).
As we can see the subprocess (cd.c.cf ||γ0sd.s.sf ) cannot execute the action send, because it should
firstly synchronize with another process to execute the action sd, which is impossible.
8. Conclusion and future work
This paper presents a formal an automatic approach for the enforcement of security policies in
concurrent programs. We used a variant of BPA to specify security policy and we have enhanced ACP
with a special enforcement operator ∂Pϕ . We proved that ACP
φ and ACP are equivalent by showing
that ∀P ∈ ACPφ , ∀Pϕ ∈ BPA∗δ,1, we have:
P ⊗ ϕ = ∂Pϕ (P)↔τ ∂Hi(τIi(⌈P⌉i||γ0⌈|Pϕ |⌉i)).
This results provided an elegant technique allowing to automatically enforce security policies on
systems specified usingACP . Indeed,weneed simply towrite the enforced systemusing the embedded
enforcement operator of ACPφ and to take it to its equivalent in ACP given by the previous formula.
This result allows us to apply the approach to real language such as Java.
As future work, we want to extend BPA∗δ,1 to handle exceptions i.e.: we give the end user the
possibility to specify the actions to be executedwhen the security policy is about to be violated instead
of simply halting the program. We want also to optimize the enforced program so that we reduce as
much as we can the treatment added by the enforcement operator.
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